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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
liability cases, and has taken the occasion to declare that the doc-
trine of mutuality is a "dead letter." 132
The recent case of Planty v. Potter-DeWitt Corp. 33 illustrates
the use of defensive collateral estoppel in a derivative liability case.
The plaintiff was injured when his automobile left a road being
re-constructed by the defendant under contract with the State.
Plaintiff instituted suit against the State, but his action was dis-
missed for failure to prove negligence and for failure to establish
his own freedom from contributory negligence. In plaintiff's
subsequent action against the defendant contractor, his complaint
was dismissed on the ground that "since the State's liability was
derived from its nondelegable responsibility to maintain its high-
way in a safe condition . . . [plaintiff] has had his day in court
on the very issue he seeks to litigate in the present suit and is
thus precluded by res judicata to litigate the question anew. .. ," '14
Collateral estoppel: DeWitt principle extended to fellow passenger
situation.
In B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 35 discussed in a recent edition
of the Survey,'36 the Court of Appeals allowed the offensive use
of collateral estoppel. The Court posited two requirements. First,
it must be unquestioned that the original action had been vigorously
defended, and second, the later cause of action must be derivative
of the first cause of action. Although the Court did not explicitly
define what it meant by a derivative action, it was assumed by
the editors of the Survey that a close relationship between the
initial and succeeding plaintiff, such as the owner-operator relation-
ship, was meant. However, the question was posed as to whether
the Court would have considered a passenger's relationship to the
driver as a sufficient nexus. It was felt that to answer in the
affirmative would be, logically, to extend the offensive use of
132B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198,
278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967).
13327 App. Div. 2d 401, 279 N.Y.S.2d 933 (3d Dep't 1967).
134 Planty v. Potter-DeWitt Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d at 402, 279 N.Y.S.2d
at 939.
'35 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). In DeWitt
the defendant's jeep had collided with a vehicle owned by the plaintiff and
driven by one Farnum. Farnum was successful in a suit for personal in-juries and recovered $5,000. Subsequently, plaintiff sued for property dam-
ages of $8,500 and was granted summary judgment upon the ground that the
judgment in Farnum's suit was res judicata of the issues, with the excep-
tion of damages.
136 The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv.
128, 150 (1967).
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collateral estoppel to the perennial hypothetical train wreck situa-
tion.13 7
Recently, in Quick v. O'Connell,18 plaintiff's decedent was
killed and his fellow passenger was injured in a two-car collision
in which both owner-operators were killed. The injured passenger
recovered judgment against the estates of both owner-operators for
negligence. Plaintiff, contending that his suit was derivative of the
fellow passenger's suit, invoked DeWitt and moved for summary
judgment. The court, while accepting this contention, denied the
motion, but limited the issues for subsequent trial to those of the
contributory negligence of plaintiff's decedent and damages.
Seemingly, the decision in the instant case carries DeWitt
beyond the intent of the Court of Appeals. The majority in
DeWitt, at the conclusion of its opinion, was careful to reiterate
the specific facts upon which it was allowing recovery, i.e., the suc-
ceeding plaintiff's right was derivative in nature.139 It is difficult
to conceive that plaintiff's decedent in Quick derived his right of
recovery from his fellow passenger. Thus, the broad holding
envisioned in the train wreck hypothetical has apparently become
a reality.
137 One-hundred passengers are aboard a train that crashes. In separate
suits for alleged negligence, the first fifty plaintiffs are unsuccessful. The
fifty-first plaintiff, possibly because he is an infant, recovers a verdict from
a sympathetic jury. The defendant could not use the fifty adjudications of
its innocence against the remaining forty-nine plaintiffs, since they had
not litigated the issue of defendant's negligence themselves. However, a
broad interpretation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel could allow theseforty-nine plaintiffs to receive summary judgment on the issue of defendant's
negligence, based upon the single recovery by the infant plaintiff, if it is
shown that defendant vigorously litigated that case. See generally Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REv. 281 (1957).
138 53 Misc. 2d 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County
1967).
139 "In this case, where the issues, as framed by the pleadings, were no
broader and no different than those raised in the first lawsuit; where the
defendant here offers no reason for not holding him to the determination
in the first action; where it is unquestioned (and probably unquestionable)
that the first action was defended with full vigor and opportunity to be
heard; and where the plaintiff in the present action, the owner of the
vehicle, derives his right to recovery from the plaintiff in the first action,
although they do not technically stand in the relationship of privity, there
is no reason either in policy or precedent to hold that the judgment in the
Farnum case is not conclusive in the present action. .. ." B.R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596,
601-02 (1967).
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